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Framing of crisis events is to a large extent contested (Boin, t’Hart, 
& McConnell, 2009; Frandsen & Johansen, 2017; Seeger & Sellnow, 
2016). Even if risk and crisis communication research largely focus 
on how to create best practices for designing and disseminating crisis 
communications and reaching a common public understanding of 
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ABSTRACT
Framing of crisis events is to a large extent contested, with multiple sources and confl icting 
messages. Theories of crisis communication acknowledge how people try to deal with these 
competing messages, and this article seeks to deepen the understanding the process of sense 
making of crisis events by connecting crisis communication to the spiral of silence theory. The 
spiral of silence theory, founded by Elisabeth Noelle-Neuman, proposes that people are less 
willing to express their opinions if they believe their beliefs are shared by a minority. This will lead 
to a spiral in which those who feel their opinions are popular are more inclined to express their 
opinions, and those who perceive their opinions are unpopular among the public become more 
silent. This study analyzed changes over time in the willingness to express opinions about the 
refugee crisis in Europe using a two-wave Web-panel survey (N = 1,185) in Sweden in 2015–2016. 
The focus is the impact of changing government policy, which moved from a generous refugee 
policy toward a more restrictive policy. Changes toward a more restrictive refugee policy did 
not seem to change the overall picture. Those supporting a more restrictive policy were still less 
inclined to speak their true opinions about the refugee crisis, even if the policy had changed in 
their favor. On the other hand, respondents supporting a more generous refugee policy seemed 
to become more cautious about expressing their opinions about the refugee crisis after the policy 
change, especially when talking to strangers.
KEYWORDS: Spiral of silence; crisis communication; opinion change; refugee crisis; 
interpersonal communication
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crisis situations, it is also pointed out that crisis events take place in 
situations of framing contest (Frandsen & Johansen, 2017; Heath & 
O’Hair, 2010; Seeger & Sellnow, 2016). Questions of contest can be, Is 
there actually a crisis going on? Who is responsible for the upcoming 
situation? How can it be solved? What is the proper way of dealing 
with the crises? These questions will be addressed by decision makers, 
organizations, news media, and citizens, and crisis decisions are thus 
made in an environment of competing messages (Boin, t’Hart, Stern, & 
Sundelius, 2005).
When discussing citizens’ perceptions of crisis events, we have to 
consider how this frame contest affects the sense making of a crisis. Risk 
and crisis communication has shown how people use different strate-
gies to make sense of an uncertain situation (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013; 
Vigsø & Odén, 2016). One example of these strategies is convergence 
theory, which focuses on the ways in which individuals make sense of 
competing information by collecting and contemplatinge information 
from different sources and discussing this information with family, 
friends, and neighbors (Anthony, Sellnow, & Millner, 2013; Sellnow, 
Ulmer, Seeger, & Littlefield, 2009). However, one possible problem with 
the process of sense making might be that all these communication 
opportunities are not always at hand. In crises with competing frames, 
people might not always be comfortable expressing what they really 
think about different aspects of the crisis. Some speak out and discuss 
controversial issues with their families, friends at work, or even people 
they do not know. Others stay silent and are afraid to let others know 
what they really think about the issue at hand.
This article seeks to deepen the understanding the process of sense 
making of crisis events by connecting crisis communication to the spiral 
of silence theory. Even if theories of crisis communication acknowledge 
that people try to deal with competing messages, it has not taken into 
consideration the social dynamics of the sense-making process. The 
spiral of silence might be a way to further understand how people react 
to and communicate in times of crisis.
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Literature Review
The Spiral of Silence
The spiral of silence theory proposes that people are less willing to 
express their opinions when they believe their beliefs are shared by a 
minority (Noelle-Neuman, 1984). We are sensitive to our surrounding 
social environment and will not speak out if we fear becoming socially 
isolated. This will lead to a spiral in which those who feel their opin-
ions are popular are more inclined to express their opinions and those 
who perceive their opinions are unpopular among the public become 
more silent.
The spiral of silence is seen as one of the most influential theories 
of communication and political communication over the last half-
century (Donsbach, Salmon, & Tsfati, 2016) and has been tested in 
numerous studies. The general conclusion of meta-analyses shows a 
general but weak relationship between the perceived opinion climate 
and respondents’ willingness to express their opinions (Glynn, Hayes, 
& Shanahan, 1997; Glynn & Huge, 2016).
But the theory has been criticized and studies have been contested 
for a number of reasons. The spiral of silence theory is so complex and 
contains so many assumptions that the whole theory has never been 
(and probably never will be) comprehensively tested (Matthes & Hayes, 
2016). Scholars have, over the years, separated the model into manage-
able parts, but still, after almost 40 years of research, we find research 
criticizing everything from the assumptions and the generalizability 
to the design and how to measure key concepts of the theory (Hayes, 
2007; Matthes & Hayes, 2016; Neuwirth, Frederick, & Mayo, 2007).
One major critical point in previous research is how research has 
failed to capture the dynamics of the theory. As Matthes and Hayes 
(2016) argued, research has neglected to observe the spiral in the theory 
because of improper research design. Most studies use cross-sectional 
data or aggregate data; the former can only capture a frozen moment of 
the phenomena, and the latter have an ecology fallacy problem (Mat-
thes & Hayes, 2016). Whether people actually change their willingness 
to speak out because of the opinion climate is, to a large extent, still 
unknown.
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As stated previously, the general aim of this article is to use the spiral 
of silence in studying crisis communication, but the purpose is also to 
deepen the knowledge of the dynamics of the spiral of silence theory. 
Therefore this work builds on panel data from Sweden in 2015 and 2016 
in which respondents were asked questions about their willingness to 
express their opinions about the refugee crisis in Europe.
The Swedish government changed its refugee policy from an “open-
door policy” to one of the most restrictive in Europe in late fall 2015 
(Ghersetti & Odén, in press).1 Because of the policy change, we are 
able to measure people’s readiness to share opinions about the refugee 
crisis just before the policy changed and after the change was made. 
This makes it possible to evaluate whether respondents changed their 
willingness to speak out when the opinion climate changed.
By studying the refugee crisis, the study also fulfills one of the 
important assumptions of the spiral of silence—the requirement of 
a value-laden issue. Immigration and refugees have a strong moral 
component and are controversial and therefore in line with Noelle-
Neuman’s argument that it is only from a moral or normative element 
that one can fear the threat of isolation (Gearhart & Zhang, 2015; 
Noelle-Neuman, 1984; Scheufele & Moy, 2000). This will of course 
also be a good example of an issue were there are competing frames 
and opinions. The empirical aim is therefore to analyze to what extent 
individuals change their willingness to express their opinions when 
government policy concerning a value-laden issue changes.
The organization of the article is as follows. The next section re-
views the key assumptions and results of spiral of silence research. This 
framework is used in more detail to discuss some shortcomings and 
criticisms of spiral of silence research. On the basis of previous findings, 
a number of hypotheses are proposed, and thereafter the methodology 
and measures used in the study are described. After presenting the re-
sults, the article ends with conclusions, a discussion of the limitations 
of the study, and implications of the results for crisis communication.
The Spiral of Silence: Theory and Previous Findings
One of the important needs of the spiral of silence theory is a value-laden 
issue. As said earlier, fear of isolation is only relevant when the question 
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at hand is controversial. In spiral of silence research, immigration is 
categorized as a transitory issue (Gearhart & Zhang, 2015). Transitory 
issues are not constantly in the public eye but reemerge from time to 
time. The issue salience of immigration has increased during the last 
decade in Sweden and Europe in general (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 
2008). Immigration in 2015 was, for the first time, viewed as the most 
important societal issue among Swedish citizens (53% mentioned im-
migration as an important societal issue; Ohlsson, Ekengren, & Solevid, 
2016), and immigration was also the most prominent issue during the 
2014 election campaign in the news media (Johansson, 2017). Analyses 
of the news media content of the election also indicates a strong focus 
on immigration, and the refugee crisis was the dominant news story 
during fall 2015 (Ghersetti & Odén, in press).
Some studies of the spiral of silence have focused on immigration 
to test the theory. Matthes, Morrison, and Schemer (2010) analyzed the 
national referendum about the naturalization of Swiss immigrants. The 
results provided empirical support because those perceived as being 
a minority expressed their opinions to a lesser extent. This tendency 
was especially prevalent among those who were less convinced of their 
opinions. Similar empirical support was also found in a study using 
Asian immigration to Australia as a case (Louis, Duck, Terry, & Lalonde, 
2010). Gearhart and Zhang (2015) also included a question on immi-
gration (if undocumented immigrants should have the opportunity 
to receive permanent residency) when testing different types of issues 
and the spiral of silence theory. The authors found robust support for 
the spiral of silence theory related to both immigration and the other 
investigated issues (abortion and gay marriage).
A recurrent criticism of spiral of silence research is the lack of lon-
gitudinal studies. In most cases, research uses cross-sectional data and 
can only, as Matthes and Hayes (2016) put it, analyze the social confor-
mity hypothesis. Cross-sectional data measure at a single moment the 
difference between respondents expressing their opinions and those 
being silent. However, this does not capture the dynamics of opinion 
change, which is one of the central aspects of the theory. To investigate 
if the opinion climate leads to changes in the willingness to speak out 
(the change hypothesis), studies over time are needed. Noelle-Neuman 
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(1984) used trend survey data to demonstrate how aggregate opinions 
increased or decreased depending on the opinion climate. As Matthes 
and Hayes (2016) noted, this might give an intuitive understanding of 
the phenomenon, but it is not a proper way to study changes on an 
individual level and might also suffer from ecology fallacy. Trend survey 
data are therefore not appropriate to study the dynamics of the spiral 
of silence theory. A few studies have used panel data. Shamir (1997) 
used a two-wave panel to investigate the spiral of silence and climate 
change, and McDonald, Glynn, Kim, and Ostman (2001) used a four-
wave panel from 1948 and conducted a secondary analysis on opinion 
climate and candidate preference.
The asylum regime in Sweden has been generous and sometimes 
described as an “open-door policy” (Ghersetti & Odén, in press). The 
policy had broad support among the political parties, and only the 
nationalist-populist Swedish Democrats (13% in the 2014 general elec-
tion) opposed the policy. It should also be noted that Swedes are more 
open to immigrants and welcoming refugees compared to citizens in 
the rest of Europe (Sides & Citrin, 2007).
The refugee situation escalated during fall 2015, when 10,000 refu-
gees arrived in Sweden every week and Migration Agency of Sweden 
estimates claimed that 190,000 would seek asylum in Sweden in 2015 
(in reality, it was 162,000).2 The Dublin Convention states that refu-
gees should seek protection in the first European Union (EU) land 
they enter,3 but most EU countries let refugees move to other coun-
tries. Sweden and Germany were considered popular because of their 
generous refugee policies, but the number of refugees caused strong 
tensions in the asylum-seeking process in Sweden (and Germany), not 
least in terms of housing. The Swedish government (a coalition of the 
Social Democrats and the Green Party), therefore, decided to change 
the policy, and in November 2015, identity checks were imposed on all 
modes of transport to Sweden, and the right to bring families to Sweden 
was severely restricted. In one day, Sweden had changed its refugee 
policy from being the most generous in the EU to being one of the 
most restrictive. The only party that opposed the new policy was the 
Left Party, with less than 10% support (Ghersetti & Odén, in press). The 
refugee situation in Sweden (and Europe) can therefore these years be 
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described in terms of a crisis as defined by Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger 
(2007): “a specific, unexpected, non-routine event or series of events 
that creates a high level of uncertainty and a significant or perceived 
threat to high priority goals” (p. 7).
From what we know from opinion research, we can expect changes 
in public opinion when policies change. Zaller (1992) discussed the elite 
dominance in the news and concluded that the public reacts to elite 
perspectives on information, and even if not everyone changes his or 
her mind, changes in elite opinions will have a major impact on citizens’ 
views of societal issues (Zaller, 1992; see also Bennet, 1990; Iyengar & 
Kinder, 1987). In fall 2015, many political parties abruptly changed their 
refugee policies. Results also indicate that media coverage also generally 
follows the framing of the changed policy (Ghersetti & Odén, in press).
Thus, in line with the spiral of silence theory, we would, before the 
policy change, expect a greater willingness to express opinions about 
the refugee crisis among respondents supporting a more generous 
refugee policy compared to those holding a more restrictive view. This 
scenario would probably change because of the changing policy, and 
we would expect that those favoring a more restrictive view would be 
more willing to share their opinions. Following this logic, the respon-
dents supporting a more generous policy would be silenced. The study 
hypotheses follow:
H1: Opinion congruency in refugee policy between respondents’ opin-
ions and government policy will be positively related to a willingness 
to express opinions about the refugee crisis.
H2: When government policy changes to a more restrictive refugee 
policy, respondents supporting a restrictive policy will increase their 
willingness to express their opinions about the refugee crisis.
H3: When government policy changes to a more restrictive refugee 
policy, respondents supporting a generous policy will decrease their 
willingness to express their opinions about the refugee crisis.
The spiral of silence phenomenon is generally tested on speaking out 
in front of unknown people (“talking to a stranger on the bus” is often 
used in survey questions) and is generally believed to be weaker when 
64 johansson
it is related to the social groups to which the individual belongs. The 
fear of isolation tends to be less pronounced when it comes to talking 
with family, friends, and work colleagues and classmates (Hampton et 
al., 2014). Against this background, we would expect the willingness to 
express an opinion about the refugee crisis to be more accepted when 
it comes to family and friends than other reference groups:
H4: The willingness to express opinions about the refugee crisis will 
be more accepted when talking to family and friends, compared 
with work colleagues and classmates and people respondents do not 
know so well.
Because the elite opinion changed and the news media seemed to 
report this change without challenging the dominant frame (Ghersetti 
& Odén, in press), the two waves can be viewed as capturing the change 
in opinion climate on an aggregate level. In this sense, one could ar-
gue that the design follows Noelle-Neuman’s (1984) original measure 
of opinion climate, where she emphasized that the opinion climate is 
about the factual gain or loss of ground among the population, not if 
the individual also perceives this process. However, in most spiral of 
silence research, a common way to measure the opinion climate is to 
ask respondents how they perceive the general opinion position on 
the issue and compare these answers with their own issue position 
(Matthes & Hayes, 2016). Even so, there have been many suggestions 
about how to measure the opinion climate. Some have asked about the 
opinion among the general public (Shamir, 1997), while others have 
focused on different reference groups (Moy, Domke, & Stamm, 2001; 
Oshagan, 1996). An interesting and maybe also troublesome aspect in 
previous research is the lack of mass media indicators in many studies. 
Matthes and Hayes (2016) highlighted that only a few studies actually 
include media content in their analyses and fail to establish a connec-
tion between the media content to which respondents are exposed 
and their perception of the opinion climate. However, there are a few 
examples of studies where the climate of opinion is measured as seen to 
be conveyed through the mass media (Matera & Salwen, 1992). To arrive 
at a more thorough understanding of the processes, the design of this 
Expressing Opinions About the Refugee Crisis in Europe 65
study also includes an analysis of those respondents who changed their 
inclination to speak out (see also Gearhart & Zhang, 2015) to evaluate 
to what extent this disposition may be related not only to the changing 
opinion climate but also to perceptions of the news media’s reporting 
(media congruency), which can be viewed as a subjective measure of 
the opinion climate. A proposed research question is as follows:
To what extent can respondents’ willingness to express their opinions 
about the refugee crises be related to media congruency?
Method
To try to overcome some of the critical points referred to earlier, this 
study of the spiral of silence in crisis events uses (a) a two-wave panel 
study to be able to investigate changes in willingness to express opin-
ions; (b) analysis of a real-world event—not a hypothetical—which 
makes the situation more real for respondents (see Hayes, 2007); and, 
because there was a dramatic change in elite opinion of the refugee 
issue, where all major parties changed their opinions and decided to 
change the policy, (c) observations of whether the change of (elite) 
opinion climate also affects willingness to speak out.
Data Collection
Data for this study were collected in November 2015 (before the policy 
change) and April 2016 (after the policy change) and were generated 
by the Laboratory of Opinion Research (Lore) at the University of 
Gothenburg using a Web survey panel of Swedish citizens. The panel 
contains both self-recruited respondents (approximately 60,000) and 
respondents recruited from probability-based population samples 
(approximately 10,000).4
The chosen sample (2,500) was randomly selected from the citizen 
panel and was stratified to reflect the general population according to 
gender, age, and education. The first wave of the survey was collected 
between October 26 and November 5, 2015, with a response rate of 
63%. The second wave was sent out to respondents (who answered 
the first survey) between April 21 and May 3, 2016. The response rate 
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of the second wave was 71%. In both panel waves, 1,185 respondents 
answered the questions.
The design using a two-wave panel (i.e., interviewing the same per-
sons two times) enhances the possibility to track individual trajectories 
over time. It makes it easier to rule out other factors that might affect 
the results and strengthens claims of causal interpretations (Berrington, 
Smith, & Sturgis, 2006).
Measures
Willingness to speak out. The criterion variable in this study was 
measured by three questions capturing different social spheres: (a) fam-
ily and friends, (b) work colleagues and classmates, and (c) strangers. 
The following question was posed: “To what extent do you feel you 
can speak out about the refugee crisis with your family and closest 
friends?” Respondents were given a 5-point scale on which to place 
themselves, ranging from 1 (to a very large extent) to 5 (to a very small 
extent; Wave 1, M = 4.56, SD = 0.80; Wave 2, M = 4.57, SD = 0.78). The 
same scale was used to ask if respondents were willing to speak out 
about the refugee crisis with people at work and in school: “To what 
extent do you feel you can speak out honestly about the refugee crisis 
with work colleagues and classmates?” (Wave 1, M = 3.87, SD = 1.22; 
Wave 2, M = 3.79, SD = 1.21).
To measure the willingness to speak out in relation to strangers, 
the third question asked, “To what extent do you feel you can speak 
honestly about the refugee crisis with people you don’t know well?” 
Respondents were given a 5-point scale on which to place themselves, 
ranging from 1 (to a very large extent) to 5 (to a very small extent; Wave 1, 
M = 3.21, SD = 1.37; Wave 2, M = 3.04, SD = 1.38).
Own opinion. Respondents were asked to express their opinions 
about the refugee issue by measuring to what extent they would favor 
a more restrictive, status quo, or generous refugee policy. The question 
was posed, “How well do the following statements comply with what you 
think of the refugee reception?” Respondents answered using a 5-point 
scale to express their opinions about the refugee issue, ranging from 1 
(we should receive far fewer refugees than today) to 5 (we should accept far 
more refugees than today; Wave 1, M = 2.77, SD = 1.42; Wave 2, M = 2.68, 
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SD = 1.43). The variable was computed as a dichotomous variable in the 
analysis (restrictive/generous policy opinion). Respondents with the 
opinion of receiving fewer refugees in both waves and being pleased 
with the present level in Wave 2 were considered as supporting a re-
strictive policy. With the same logic, respondents claiming Sweden 
should accept more refugees in both waves and being content with the 
present level of refugee reception in Wave 1 were coded as supporting 
a generous policy. This recoding will of course create a loss of data 
concerning attitude change, but the rationale is to be able to include 
those changing their minds due to the policy change.
Perception of media congruency. As pointed out previously, 
there is a discussion in spiral of silence research about the importance 
of perceptions of opinion climate. The measure of media congruency 
(evaluation of news media reporting) is viewed as an alternative way to 
measure the subjective perception of the opinion climate. Even if this 
is not a straightforward question of how a respondent’s own opinion 
is related to the general opinion, we know from previous research that 
people tend to generalize media content to the general view of societal 
problems and their effect on public opinion (Gunther & Storey, 2003; 
Perloff, 2015; Schulz & Roessler, 2012). Evaluation of news media re-
porting can therefore be seen as a proxy for the respondents’ views on 
the opinion climate in society.
The respondents were asked to evaluate the news media reporting 
of the refugee crisis with the question, “How do you think the news 
media so far has reported on the refugee situation?” The scale had 7 
points, ranging from 1 (not good at all) to 7 (very good; Wave 1, M = 4.22, 
SD = 1.48; Wave 2, M = 3.89, SD = 1.45).
Noelle-Neuman (1984) raised the question of the importance of 
personal traits related to the spiral of silence phenomenon (Neuwirth 
et al., 2007; Scheufele & Moy, 2000). Controlling some of these aspects 
by inclusion in the analysis were political interest, education, gender, 
and age.
Political interest. A respondent’s political interest was measured 
by the 4-point-scale question “How interested are you in politics?” 
ranging from 1 (great interest) to 4 (no interest). The panel consisted of 
respondents with a greater interest in politics compared with the general 
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public (M = 1.74, SD = 0.66). This is related to the recruitment process 
and the questions asked in the panel, where societal issues dominated.
Education. In the survey, respondents answered a question about 
their highest level of education with fixed response alternatives (only 
elementary school; high school, less than 3 years; high school, 3 years 
or longer; postsecondary education [not university], less than 3 years; 
postsecondary education [not university], 3 years or longer; college/uni-
versity, less than 3 years; college/university, 3 years or longer; PhD). Even 
if the scale was ordinal, it was treated as interval in the analysis. The sam-
ple contained a larger number of people with college/university educa-
tions compared to the overall Swedish population (M = 6.91, SD = 1.87).
Gender. This variable is measured by a self-reported question with 
three alternatives: woman, man, and other. Only four respondents 
chose the last option, and they were excluded from the analysis. The 
sample had a larger proportion of male respondents compared with 
the general population (M = 1.52, SD = 0.50).
Age. Age was measured by the panelists’ self-reported years of 
birth. The sample contained respondents aged between 18 and 72 years 
(M = 47, SD = 13.99), which means that the sample contained more 
middle-aged and fewer young (<30 years) and old (>70 years) people 
compared with the population as a whole.
Results
The results in Table 1 indicate strong support for the proposed differ-
ence in the preparedness to give voice to opinions about the refugee 
crisis dependent on to whom a person talks. Overall, respondents are 
willing to express their opinions among family and friends, and the 
policy change did not change this attitude at all (Wave 1, M = 4.56; 
Wave 2, M = 4.57). As predicted in H4, respondents are a little less 
comfortable speaking out on this issue when talking to their colleagues 
and classmates, and over time, they tend to be less willing to express 
their opinions (Wave 1, M = 3.87; Wave 2, M = 3.79). But even after the 
policy change, a majority feel they can express their opinions when 
talking to people they meet at work or school.
This tendency is even clearer when asking about talking to people 
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respondents do not know so well, both in terms of generally being less 
willing to speak out and changing toward being more silent after the 
policy change (Wave 1, M = 3.18; Wave 2, M = 3.03). On this general 
level, we therefore discover a significant tendency toward a more si-
lenced public opinion, in terms of being willing to express opinions 
outside the family setting. Even so, the effect size (d = .013, d = .07) 
indicates that the magnitude of the policy change on the willingness 
to speak opinions in public is rather low. It should also be noted that 
a majority of all respondents feel they can talk about the refugee crisis 
even if they talk to people they do not know so well, both before and 
after the policy change.
But are these tendencies uniform, or do they, as H1, H2, and H3 
predicted, depend on the opinions about the refugee issue among the 
respondents? In Table 2, the analysis is separated among those who 
support a generous and a more restrictive refugee policy.
Moving on to the first (H1) hypothesis, we expected to find a correla-
tion between supporting the government policy on the refugee issue 
and a willingness to speak out. However, the results show that those 
favoring a more generous refugee policy to a larger extent are willing 
to express their opinions about the refugee crisis, both before and 
after the policy change (family and friends, M = 4.86/4.81; work col-
leagues and classmates, M = 4.48/4.30; people you do not know so well, 
M = 3.97/3.68). The difference compared with respondents favoring 
a more restrictive policy is significant, where a clear majority instead 
are less comfortable expressing their opinions (family and friends, 
M = 4.33/4.37; work colleagues and classmates, M = 3.33/3.37; people 
you do not know so well, M = 2.46/2.46). On the basis of these two 
measurement points, it seems like those supporting a more restrictive 
policy are less likely to express their opinions, even if the policy has 
changed, favoring their position. H1 can therefore only be partly sup-
ported.
The second (H2) and third (H3) hypotheses focused on changes of 
expressing opinions, not the majority/minority position. H2 must be 
rejected because there was no change among those supporting a restric-
tive policy before and after the policy change, independent of whom 
they talk to. Even if the policy change supported their opinions, they 
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TABLE 3 Predictors That Impact the Willingness to Express Opinions About the Refugee 
Crisis in Conversations with Family and Friends, Work Colleagues and Classmates, and 
People You Do Not Know So Well
Willingness to 
speak out before 
policy change
Willingness to speak 
out after policy 
change
Decreased 
willingness to 
speak out
Family and friends
Own opinion (generous policy) .33*** .29*** −.11**
Media congruency .03 .07* −.04
Political interest (low) −.01 −.08** .06
Education (high) −.07 −.07* .00
Gender (woman) −.07 −.06 .03
Age .02 .06 −.04
Adjusted R² (%) 10 9 1
N 816 818 815
Work colleagues and classmates
Own opinion (generous policy) .48*** .43*** −.01
Media congruency .08* .12*** .02
Political interest (low) −.03 −.10** .08*
Education (high) −.04 −.10** .04
Gender (woman) .01 .02 −.01
Age .04 .04 .00
Adjusted R² (%) 20 12 0
N 815 811 807
People you do not know so well
Own opinion (generous policy) .50*** .45*** .12**
Media congruency .11** .09* .05
Political interest (low) −.04 −.09* .06
Education (high) .03 −.05 .02
Gender (woman) −.02 −.06 −.03
Age .04 −.01 .08*
Adjusted R² (%) 28 19 2
N 816 817 814
Note. Values are ordinary least squares, standardized regression coefficients. The dependent 
variables are created by computing the variable willingness to speak out in the two waves, where 
respondents could be more/less willing to speak out. The dichotomized variable for decreased 
willingness to speak out comprises those less inclined to express their opinions compared with 
those having the same opinion in both waves and those being more motivated to speak out. 
The media congruency measure is the absolute difference in opinion about the media reporting 
and respondents’ own issue opinions in both waves. Tests to see if the data met the assumption 
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still felt hesitant to speak out in public about their opinions. Moving 
on to H3, we find clear support for what was expected. Respondents 
supporting a more generous policy have to some extent been silenced. 
After the policy change, significantly fewer respondents were willing to 
express their views on the refugee crisis. This can be found independent 
of social sphere, even if the tendency is clearly related to social groups 
outside family and close friends.
To further examine the mechanisms of the spiral of silence, Table 3 
shows to what extent changes in the willingness to speak out are related 
to a person’s own opinion and perception of media congruency. We 
also control the results by demographics, which sometimes are treated 
as personal traits with a possible influence on willingness to speak out 
in public.
The results of three regression models are shown in Table 3, where 
the dependent variable measures respondents’ willingness to express 
their opinions, both at and between the two measurement points. 
The first two models analyze the data as cross-sectional data to see if 
media congruency affects the predisposition to speak out before and 
after the policy change. The last model analyzes changes and whether 
media congruency has an impact on opinion change (i.e., less willing 
to express opinions).
In all three social spheres, we find that issue position has an impact 
on the respondents’ willingness to reveal their opinions about the refu-
gee crisis, both before and after the policy change (family and friends, 
β = .33/.29; work colleagues and classmates, β = .48/.43; people you do 
not know so well, β = .50/.44). The more a person supports a gener-
ous policy, the more willing he or she is to speak out. This is the same 
tendency we saw in Tables 1 and 2.
Also, media congruency has an impact on the tendency to speak 
out. Respondents who are more critical toward the media reporting 
also seem to be less inclined to reveal their opinions. This is found in 
of collinearity indicated that multicollinearity was not a concern (values ranging between the 
four regression models, own opinion, tolerance = .78–.82, VIF = 1.22–1.28; media congruency, 
tolerance = .85–.90, VIF = 1.12–1.18; political interest, tolerance = .93–.94, VIF = 1.06–1.07; education, 
tolerance = .90–.91, VIF = 1.05–1.10; gender, tolerance = .88–.89, VIF = 1.13; age, tolerance = .95, 
VIF = 1.05–1.06).
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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all social spheres after the policy change (family and friends, β = .07; 
work colleagues and classmates, β = .12; people you do not know so 
well, β = .09). Before the change of policy, the effect of media con-
gruency was significant for talking to people at work and in school, 
β = .08, and strangers, β = .11, but not in discussions among family and 
friends, β = .03.
Political interest also affected this opinion, especially after the policy 
change. Those less interested in politics seem to be more inclined to 
hide their opinions, independent of whom they talk to (family and 
friends, β = −.08; work colleagues and classmates, β = −.10; people you 
do not know so well, β = −.09). The same holds for lower educated 
respondents, but only when speaking with family members and close 
friends, β = −.08, and people at work and in school, β = −.10.
When analyzing the change of willingness to speak out, the results 
indicate overall a weak relationship between the proposed variables 
(i.e., low explained variance). The most important factor is a person’s 
own opinion on the issue, but the effect goes in different directions, 
depending on social sphere. Among family and friends, we find that 
supporting a more generous policy does not lead to a decreased inclina-
tion to reveal opinions, β = −.11, but it does so when talking to strangers, 
β = .12. Moreover, there seems to be no direct effect on the inclination 
of changes in speaking out related to how news media performance 
was evaluated and the respondents’ own opinions (media congru-
ency). If someone changed his or her willingness to express his or her 
views, this change may not be related to the person’s perceptions of 
news media reporting. This does not, of course, rule out a possibility 
of indirect media impact in line with the spiral of silence theory. As 
said before, the media effect in the spiral of silence theory might be 
unconscious.
The other predictors show no significant effect, except that in-
creasingly age seems to be related to less willingness to talk about the 
refugee issue with strangers. Being a man or a woman, being low or 
highly educated, or having an interest in politics does not seem to 
matter.
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Discussion
The spiral of silence is one of the most influential media effect theories 
of the last half-century. Noelle-Neuman’s theory on how the media 
influences people’s willingness to speak their minds in public has been 
subject to many studies all over the world. However, the theory has been 
criticized in terms of conceptualization (Neuwirth et al., 2007), design 
(Matthes & Hayes, 2016), and generalization (Scheufele & Moy, 2000).
The present study analyzed changes over time in the willingness to 
express opinions about the refugee crisis in Europe using a two-wave 
Web-panel survey in Sweden in 2015–2016. In focus was the impact of 
the changing government policy, which moved from a generous refugee 
policy toward a more restrictive policy.
The posed hypotheses had mixed support. Government changes 
in policy toward a more restrictive refugee policy did not change the 
overall picture. Those supporting a more restrictive policy were still less 
inclined to speak their true opinions about the refugee crisis, even if 
the policy had changed in their favor. On the other hand, respondents 
supporting a more generous refugee policy seemed to be more cautious 
about expressing their opinions about the refugee crisis when talking 
to strangers after the policy change. The tendency to hide opinions 
about the refugee crisis was stronger when talking to strangers and less 
pronounced in relation to work colleagues and classmates, and a vast 
majority felt they could talk about the issue with family and friends.
When analyzing the research question about the extent to which 
media congruency affects willingness to speak out over time, there was 
no such influence. It is, however, important to understand the difference 
between analyzing changes and the situation at a given moment. Media 
congruency had a clear impact on the willingness to share opinions, 
both before and after the policy change, but media congruency did not 
affect changes in preferences to talk about the refugee crisis before and 
after the policy change.
What might need further discussion in relation to the spiral in 
the spiral of silence theory is the time lag in the process. Most stud-
ies include, in line with Noelle-Neuman’s suggestions about captur-
ing dynamics of the opinion climate, measures used to understand 
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respondents’ perceptions of whether their opinions are likely to become 
majority or minority (Gearhart & Zhang, 2015; Jeffres, Neuendorf, & 
Atkin, 2010; Noelle-Neuman, 1984). People who feel their opinions are 
about to reflect the majority position are more inclined to speak out. 
The change in the predisposition to express opinions on the refugee 
issue follows this pattern for those rejecting a restrictive policy but 
not among those supporting a restrictive policy. Five months after the 
policy change, one could expect that those persons who were more 
critical about accepting refugees would be more eager to speak out. But 
according to the results, we do not see this development. In line with 
what previous research has shown in asking about opinions being on 
the rise or in decline, we should have seen such a change.
Situational explanations can be proposed to explain this lack of 
willingness to speak out among those supporting a restrictive refugee 
policy. Even if the policy has changed, many might still be uncertain if 
this opinion is shared among the general public, not least because the 
government made the decision with regret and claimed the restrictive 
policy was not intended to be permanent. A fear of stigmatization might 
therefore still be possible. Because the restrictive policy has not changed 
since April 2016, more measurement points could clarify if there is a 
time lag in processes of the spiral of silence. Over time, those favoring a 
more restrictive policy might speak out, but the opinion change process 
might be slower than 5 months. To further understand the dynamics 
of the spiral of silence, one might therefore need more measurement 
points. This also highlights that there might be different dynamics de-
pending on respondents’ perceptions of whether they are in a majority 
or minority position. Regarding the refugee issue, willingness to speak 
out first changes among those who have the majority position. They 
feel uncertain and become more silent as the refugee policy changes 
to a position that is different from their own. Maybe those having the 
minority position will change, but it will take longer before they dare 
to speak out. They are not sure this change of policy position will last, 
and even if there is a change of tone in the news media, reporting the 
process of experiencing a majority position might take a while.
This might indicate there are different time lags in the spiral of si-
lence dynamics depending on if one is to become part of the majority 
Expressing Opinions About the Refugee Crisis in Europe 77
or minority opinion. Further research on the spiral of silence would be 
beneficial to better emphasize the dynamics to be able to understand 
how the spiral in the spiral of silence actually works. Other shortcom-
ings of the present study can also be discussed. In terms of generaliz-
ability, a partly recruited panel of respondents might overestimate the 
willingness to express opinions. Participating in a panel with surveys 
predominately about politics will be more attractive to people interested 
in politics, and dropout from the panel will be higher among those less 
interested in politics.
Conclusion
Let us at last move back to where we started. What are the conse-
quences for crisis communication and, more specifically, citizens’ sense 
making of a crisis related to the spiral of silence? In the introductory 
section of this article, concerns were raised about the possible dif-
ficulty discussing a controversial issue, such as the refugee crisis, in 
the sense-making process. Strategies proposed by convergence theory 
were addressed in terms of how people find and use information from 
different sources, not least in discussion with other people to handle 
competing information (Anthony et al., 2013; Sellnow et al., 2009). The 
present study does not support the raised concerns. It seems like most 
people are willing to discuss a controversial issue among both family 
and friends and people with whom they work and go to school. People 
even dare to expose their opinions about a value-laden issue like the 
refugee crisis to people they do not know well. Even if there is a ten-
dency toward a more silenced public opinion, it is not alarming when 
talking to family and friends. So even if there is a spiral of silence, it 
does not seem to undermine citizens’ sense-making processes in times 
of crisis.
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Notes
1. See https://www.migrationsverket.se/
2. https://www.migrationsverket.se/
3. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu
4. For more information about the panel, see http://www.lore.gu.se/
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